Hume\u27s Missing Shade of Blue reexamined by Faylayev, Vyacheslav
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Student Theses Baruch College 
1-1-2014 
Hume's Missing Shade of Blue reexamined 
Vyacheslav Faylayev 
Baruch College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/bb_etds/18 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue Reexamined 
 
By Vyacheslav Faylayev 
 
Submitted to the Committee of Undergraduate Honors at Baruch College of the City University 
of New York on May 5th, 2014 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 






                                                  ___________________________ 











Professor Charlotte Brooks 
 
 
P a g e  | 1 
 
HUME’S MISSING SHADE OF BLUE REEXAMINED   
By Vyacheslav Faylayev 
Table of Contents 
 
 
I. Introduction……………………………………………………….........................2  
II. Breaking Down the Missing Shade of Blue……………………………………....6   
III. The Missing Shade of Blue: Exception, Not a Threat…………………………....9 
IV. Hume’s Copy Principle & Causality………………………………………...…..15 
V. Hume’s Self-Criticism………………………………………………...……...…17 




P a g e  | 2 
 
Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue Reexamined 
Abstract 
David Hume, known as a strict empiricist, posits that all perceptions are divided into impressions and ideas. 
Except for a lower degree of vivacity, ideas directly resemble their corresponding impressions. This is the core of 
Hume’s ‘copy principle,’ which claims that all ideas are simply copies of their corresponding more lively 
impressions. Following his statement of this principle, however, Hume gives a counterexample to it in the form of a 
thought experiment, the Missing Shade of Blue. Many critics have taken this counterexample as proof that Hume is 
weakening his empirical claims and, even, that he is contradicting himself. I, however, argue that these criticisms 
arise out of a misunderstanding of Hume’s philosophical works.  Furthermore, I show how the inclusion of the 
thought experiment actually reconciles with and strengthens Hume’s copy principle by way of triangulation. In a 
more general scope, I believe the usefulness of my research sheds some light on a topic that, if even considered at 
all, has been somewhat muddled in a gray area.  
I. Introduction 
One of the major divisions among Western philosophers of the 18th century was between 
rationalists and empiricists. The debate between rationalism and empiricism centers on whether 
our knowledge can have non-sensible and non-empirical sources or whether it is solely 
dependent on sensory experience. On the one hand, the rationalist claims that there is knowledge 
that can be gained independently of sensory experience. On the other hand, the empiricist claims 
that experience is the sole and foundational source of all our knowledge. Rationalists also claim 
that certain types of knowledge are innate. Descartes, for example, argues that our concept of 
God as an infinitely perfect being is innate. This concept of God is not directly obtained through 
sensory experience, in the manner that our concepts of cats and trees are obtained, namely 
through tastes, smells, sights, and sounds. Instead, we are born with it. Conversely, empiricists 
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generally accept John Locke’s tabula rasa1 argument for the way the mind works. According to 
Locke, it is sensory experience that feeds knowledge into our minds. For empiricists, the innate 
ideas proposed by rationalists are either fictitious or must be considered derivative of our 
experience.              
David Hume, born in Edinburgh in 1711, is one of the most influential empiricists of the 
18th century. Well known as being a historian and essayist, Hume’s philosophical works 
influenced future thinkers such as Immanuel Kant and Charles Darwin.2 As an empiricist, David 
Hume also makes this rejection of innate ideas and acceptance of sensory foundationalism the 
core of his philosophy. Known as a strict empiricist, Hume takes the empirical ideas of John 
Locke and George Berkeley to an extreme. For example, unlike Locke and Berkeley, both of 
whom stray from a strictly empiricist approach when proving God’s existence3, Hume maintains 
that any evidence must come from our senses. This is evident in Hume’s copy principle, which 
states that all of our ideas are weaker yet exact copies derived from what he terms impressions. 
Furthermore, these impressions themselves, according to Hume, derive immediately from 
sensory experience.  
Perhaps Hume’s most notable works in philosophy are A Treatise of Human Nature and 
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hume published the Treatise upon returning to 
England in 1737 after attending a Jesuit college in France. It received very little literary notice 
and was ‘dead-born from the press,’ as Hume put it in an autobiographical publication written in 
                                                          
1  Latin for “blank slate” and refers to Locke’s theory that at birth no knowledge we have is innate. The mind 
is, therefore a “blank slate” waiting to be filled with data obtained through sensory experience.  
2  William Edward Morris, “David Hume”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
3  Both John Locke and George Berkeley were prominent empiricists of the 18th century. Locke claims that 
our knowledge of God comes from our intuition and Berkeley claims that God is himself an infinite spirit. Patricia 
Sheridan, “Locke’s Moral Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Section 2.3. Lisa Downing, “George 
Berkeley”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Section 3.1.3.     
P a g e  | 4 
 
1776.4 His strict empiricism, seen in opposition to religious teachings, garnered him the 
reputation of an atheist. As a result, contemporary authors and thinkers of the time consistently 
scrutinized and denounced Hume’s philosophical works throughout his life. Disappointed in the 
failure of the Treatise, Hume released what he thought was a more concise and focused 
presentation of his principles in the Enquiry roughly fifteen years later. In a public advertisement 
he boldly stated that “he was sensible of his error in going to the press too early, and he cast the 
whole anew in the following pieces, where some negligence in his former reasoning and more in 
the expression, are, he hopes, corrected.”5 Hence, the Enquiry, which received a greater 
readership when compared to the Treatise, was, to Hume, very much a fine tuning of his 
Treatise. Yet, even after fifteen years of contemplation and revision, the Enquiry retains some 
items virtually unchanged, among them the one that is of importance to this study: Hume’s 
example of the Missing Shade of Blue.6  
The Missing Shade of Blue is a thought experiment that Hume conjures early on in both 
the Treatise and Enquiry. Essentially, this thought experiment proposes that not all ideas derive 
from impressions. This, in turn, ostensibly presents a problem for Hume by conflicting directly 
with his copy principle, which states the opposite. Thus, it is surprising to find the Missing Shade 
of Blue brought into Hume’s texts, especially so soon after he established the copy principle. The 
inclusion of both the copy principle and the Missing Shade of Blue in the Treatise and Enquiry 
shows that Hume was intent on bringing forth both points. However, by doing so he raises 
                                                          
4  David Hume, “My Own Life”.  
5  David Hume, “Author’s Advertisement”, An Enquiry Concerning The Principal of Morals.  
6  Going forward, ‘Missing Shade of Blue’ refers to Hume’s thought experiment, while ‘missing shade of 
blue’ refers to the deficiency in the final shade of blue not presented in the experimental set-up of the thought 
experiment.  
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several doubts about his core philosophy. The following is Hume’s main formulation of the 
Missing Shade of Blue:  
Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly 
acquainted with colours of all kinds except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has 
been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of the colour, except that single one, be placed 
before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank, 
where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place between the 
contiguous colour than in any other. Now I ask, whether it is possible for him, from his own imagination, to 
supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been 
conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can. And this may 
serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent 
impressions, though this instance is so singular that it is scarcely worth our observing and does not merit 
that for it alone we should alter our general maxim (T 1.1.1.10).7  
On the surface this sounds as if Hume is contradicting his own philosophical principles. 
He is, after all, committed to the empiricist claim that sensory experience is the sole source of 
our ideas. Specifically, Hume seems contradictory by presenting an example that directly refutes 
his copy principle, which stipulates that “each simple idea is a ‘copy’ of the simple impression 
that it is derived from.”8 However, a detailed analysis of both the missing shade of blue as well 
as of other areas in both the Treatise and Enquiry will in fact demonstrate that his inclusion of 
the missing shade was not only justifiable, but that it serves to strengthen his principles. In 
particular, the inclusion of the thought experiment, strengthens his copy principle rather than 
diminish it. Furthermore, my analysis shows how Hume critically assesses his own theories 
allowing for the adaptability of the Missing Shade of Blue to be a part of them. Finally, my paper 
                                                          
7  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (T. 1.1.1.10). Further abbreviated as Treatise.   
8  Reginald Savage, “Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue,” 200. 
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shows how Hume’s critical assessment contextually, linguistically, and rhetorically ties the 
Missing Shade of Blue into the Treatise and Enquiry. 
II. Breaking Down The Missing Shade of Blue 
 In the excerpt above, Hume states that the Missing Shade of Blue ‘serves as proof’ and 
‘is an instance’ in which his copy principle is violated. This instance, to Hume, is so singular it 
does not warrant a change in his principle, yet it still warrants the simple idea of the missing 
shade as an exception. To understand why Hume considered the Missing Shade of Blue as 
presenting an exception to his principle that every idea derives from a corresponding impression, 
it is first necessary to define these two terms, idea and impression, as well as to break down the 
example itself.  
According to Hume, all of our experience divides into two categories, which he labels 
impressions and ideas. For Hume, impressions are simply livelier experiences than ideas. In 
other words, ideas represent faint images of their corresponding impressions. An understanding 
of this distinction serves to provide a clearer picture of Hume’s philosophy.  
Specifically, Hume states that the “first circumstance, that strikes [his] eye, is the great 
resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other particular, except their degree of 
force and vivacity.”9 This means that impressions and ideas are virtually identical aside from 
force and vivacity, namely that impressions are more vivid than ideas since they are sensations.  
The key here is that force and vivacity are referring to a difference in degree rather than a 
difference in kind.10 For example, when comparing the sensory experience of an apple with the 
                                                          
9  Treatise, (T 1.1.1.3). 
10  In other words, a difference in kind focuses on the distinction and difference between two objects or 
ideas, while a difference in degree focuses on their similarities and resemblances.  
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memory of an apple, Hume says that experiencing the apple is livelier even though every aspect 
of the memory may be the same as the actual experience. Thus, because of this almost identical 
resemblance Hume makes a bold general principle when stating that our ideas are simply fainter 
versions, or copies, of our more lively impressions. Furthermore, he does not feel it is too 
difficult a concept to grasp when he writes the following in the first paragraph of the Treatise: “I 
believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction. Every 
one of himself will readily perceive the difference between betwixt thinking and feeling (T 
1.1.1.1).”11 Turning back to our example of the apple, feeling equates to the impression of an 
apple, whereas thinking relates to the idea of an apple. Therefore, the difference between feeling 
and thinking, according to Hume, is comparable to the difference between impressions and ideas; 
the difference being that of degree rather than kind. Hume, however, does not stop at this one 
distinction between ideas and impressions. 
 His second categorization of our experience comes from the distinction that he 
establishes between what he calls ‘simple’ and complex’. According to Hume, both impressions 
and ideas can either be simple or complex. That is, there are now four categories of impressions 
and ideas: simple impressions, simple ideas, complex impressions, and complex ideas. The main 
distinction between simple and complex, Hume argues, is that simple impressions and ideas 
cannot be broken down further. In other words, simple impressions and ideas are the building 
blocks of their complex counter parts. Here Hume brings in the following example about an 
apple to illustrate this point: “Though a particular colour, taste, and smell, are qualities all united 
in this apple, it is easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from 
                                                          
11  Ibid, (T 1.1.1.1). 
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each other (T 1.1.1.2).12” Thus, it is the fact that we can conceive of the properties of the apple, 
such as its color and taste, in other objects that make the idea of the apple itself a complex idea. 
If, on the other hand, we examine the individual property of color in the apple, red in this 
instance, it then becomes possible to consider it as a simple idea for the very reason Hume stated. 
The actual shade of red that we perceive through our sight, in contrast, is a simple impression. 
Again, this divergence between the memory of the shade of red in an apple with the sensory 
experience of the apple is simply that of one in degree. It is these distinctions regarding ideas and 
impressions as well as simple and complex that concern Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue 
example. 
 Turning, in light of these distinctions between impressions and ideas, to Hume’s Missing 
Shade of Blue, I find it helpful to break apart the thought experiment into five parts in order to 
understand what Hume is aiming at. These five parts are chronologically important and are as 
follows:  
1. An individual must have experienced, through sight, a vast range of colors over an 
extended period of time. 
2. The individual must have become “perfectly acquainted” with all shades of blue except 
for one.  
3. All shades of blue, less the one the individual had not experienced, are placed in front of 
him in descending order. Doing this does not seem practical in the sense that in order to 
place all but one shade of blue in front of the individual, it requires the person  placing 
the colors to know both of all the shades of blue as well as which shade the individual is 
                                                          
12  Ibid, (T 1.1.1.2).  
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lacking in. Thus, although the thought experiment can work out in our minds, it is not 
applicable in an empirical setting. 
4. The individual will first perceive a blank where the missing shade ought to be. This blank 
is essentially the individual noticing the variance between the contiguous colors of the 
missing shade of blue. Hence, perceiving a blank, in this instance, is not literal but more 
like realizing that another shade should be in between the two already known shades of 
blue.  
5. Finally, the individual will be reasonable and, from his own imagination, fill in the 
missing shade even though he has not experienced it.    
Bringing to mind Hume’s initial claim that all ideas are merely fainter copies of their 
corresponding impressions, it seems that the now-no-longer-missing shade of blue does not fit 
the mold here, for it is an idea that came about without a corresponding impression. The setup of 
the thought experiment, namely its unique and singular nature, according to Hume, is the reason 
he does not consider the Missing Shade of Blue a threat.  Additionally, he did not elaborate on 
the thought experiment or explicitly explain it in any greater detail. This move by Hume initially 
made the inclusion of the missing shade in both the Treatise and Enquiry even more difficult to 
defend. However, looking at the example in the five divided parts makes for a better analysis for 
both Hume’s reasoning as well any counterclaims made by contemporary philosophers.  
III. The Missing Shade of Blue: Exception, Not a Threat 
 Looking at the steps of Hume’s thought experiment, the first two are critical in allowing 
the individual to progress to the next phase of the Missing Shade of Blue, eventually reaching the 
simple idea of the missing shade of blue. Without having had the experience of all the other 
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shades of blue it becomes an impossibility to come up with the now no longer missing shade, 
save for being able to experience it via sensory means. The role of the first two steps of my 
analysis of the thought experiment, thus, is to serve as the foundation that the final shade of blue 
depends on. This means that although the missing shade of blue itself is a simple idea that comes 
about without a corresponding impression, it still requires prior experiences as a foundation for 
its emergence. The prior shades of blue themselves, however, were indeed impressions since 
Hume states that the individual became “perfectly acquainted” with them. Since no prior 
impression of the final shade of blue exists to allow for a copy, the mind fulfills the copy 
principle through reasoning with the prior experiences it does have impressions of.  Therefore, as 
a result of this dependence on prior experience, Hume did not see the Missing Shade of Blue as a 
threat. Hence, the importance, at least in part, of the Missing Shade of Blue “is that it is the first 
of several cases Hume gives of ideas which the mind, working on precedent [experience], is able 
to form by its own activity.”13 Given the function of these preceding experiences, or shades of 
blue, I label them secondary impressions in this instance. This is contrary to their primary 
function of being distinct impressions for their own simple ideas of shades of blue via the copy 
principle. The label itself is strictly for prior simple impressions that have a specific secondary 
function of laying a foundation when placed in a spectrum. In the Missing Shade of Blue this 
refers to the already acquired shades of blue, which caused their own corresponding simple 
ideas. Those simple ideas of other shades of blue, in turn, lead to the missing shade of blue by 
way of the remaining three parts of the thought experiment.  
This construct of secondary impressions as well as abstract reasoning creates what Hume 
calls habits or customs in an individual. According to Hume, an individual creates a causal 
                                                          
13  Ronald Butler, ‘Hume’s Impressions’ in Impressions of Empiricism, Pp. 130-31.  
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inference, which leads to the creation of a habit or custom. Within the thought experiment, we do 
this via a combination of our secondary impressions along with our ability to infer, abstractly, 
about the notions of cause and effect and their relation to shades of blue. Hence, this ability to 
make inferences about causality, for Hume, allows an individual to use prior experiences of 
shades of blue to create a generalization. The generalization then sets up a benchmark to measure 
against when necessary. For example, if an individual has several experiences of objects falling 
when dropped, the individual will eventually come to the generalization that objects will fall 
when let go of. Additionally, this generalization, or habit, is now applied to future experiences 
even though there may arise a situation when an object does in fact not fall when dropped. In the 
Missing Shade of Blue we have a spectrum of shades of blue, or secondary impressions, that 
couple with abstract reasoning, or our ability to tell the difference between shades through causal 
inference, in order to form a habit. The habit then allows us to move forward in the thought 
experiment by allowing the individual to infer about the comparable differences in the two 
adjacent shades to the missing shade of blue, namely that they are not in line with the rest of the 
spectrum. This realization equates with Hume’s notion of being able to perceive the blank within 
the spectrum. Meaning that the individual does not need to perceive an actual blank but rather 
realize a disturbance in the continuity of the spectrum before being able to fill in the missing 
shade of blue.  
D.M. Johnson analyzes Hume’s principle of habits and customs in greater detail. Johnson 
claims that “for a person to reconstruct a shade he never saw before, he must have developed an 
appropriately detailed ‘habitual spectrum’.”14 This spectrum is essentially composed of the 
different shades of blue that the individual previously experienced, or the third division in our 
                                                          
14  D.M. Johnson, “Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue, Interpreted as Involving Habitual Spectra,” Pp 115-16. 
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analysis of the Missing Shade of Blue. The parts of the spectrum themselves are simple ideas 
obtained through sensory means. However, individually these simple ideas are not in direct 
connection to each other, meaning that they are separate and distinct simple ideas. Furthermore, 
Johnson extends his idea by stating that each simple idea is itself sui generis15 and that it is the 
steadily obtained habit that puts the simple ideas into certain relations. The previously 
experienced shades of blue in front of the individual, thus, do not have any necessary direct 
relation to each other. Rather, it is the individual that imposes the relation through the use of a 
habit. Individually, the shades of blue are merely simple impressions while collectively the 
individual gives them the function of secondary impressions. Hence it is these habitually 
imposed connections that allow the individual to conceive of the missing shade of blue.  
Linking the third part of our analysis of the Missing Shade of Blue, the spectrum 
presented to the individual, to the fourth part, the perception of a blank by the individual, further 
showcases how the final shade of blue comes about through secondary impressions. Hume’s first 
claim within the thought experiment is that the individual first perceives a gap where the shade 
should be. However, this alone requires having knowledge of certain abstract16, or complex, 
ideas. The function of these abstract ideas allows the individual to form the necessary habits that 
the final part of the thought experiment requires. Essentially, the man of thirty years who has 
experienced all but one shade of blue “will have made many of those several comparisons of 
which colors are susceptible and formed the abstract ideas of hue, brightness, and saturation – 
                                                          
15  Sui generis is a term that refers to the unique, deterministic, and/or qualitative nature of something. 
Generally used in contrast to something that is quantifiable or universal.  
16  Abstract, in this sense, contrasts with concrete ideas. Specifically, abstract is referring to objects that are 
not spatial. Hence, objects like mathematics are considered abstract while objects such as trees and rocks are 
considered concrete.  
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determinate forms of the abstract idea of degree of quality that take as more determinate forms 
the abstract ideas of the distinct hues and their distinct shades.”17  
These abstract ideas of hue, brightness, and saturation are necessary conditions in order 
to move from the ‘perceiving a blank’ step of the Missing Shade of Blue to the ‘filling in the 
blank’ step. However, these abstract ideas are obtained in the same fashion that Hume has set up 
in his initial principle; namely that all ideas precede their impressions save for the type of idea of 
the missing shade of blue. Hume takes note of this in the Treatise when he writes: “Ideas 
produce images of themselves in new ideas; but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from 
impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or 
immediately, from their corresponding impressions (T. 1.1.1.11).”18 Hume, therefore, clearly 
saw that his initial principle still holds true, even of the Missing Shade of Blue. Accordingly, he 
did not find it to be a threat since it is foundationally dependent on the individual’s command of 
secondary impressions through the use of the abstract ideas of hue, brightness, and saturation that 
led to the final shade of blue.  
Looking now to the transition between part four, perceiving the blank, to part five, filling 
in the blank with the missing shade of blue, it becomes evident that the individual has a firm 
grasp of what hue, brightness, and saturation are with respect to the spectrum of blue shades 
presented in front of him. Furthermore, although the distinction between lightness and darkness 
as well as hue initially applies to a spectrum of shades of color, the individual should then be 
able to distinguish these features in a single shade.19 Thus, the habit firmly established through 
prior experience fills the initial blank with the no longer missing shade of blue. Looking at the 
                                                          
17  William Williams, “Is Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue a Red Herring,” 91. 
18  Treatise, (T 1.1.1.11). 
19  Karann Durland, “Hume’s First Principle, His Missing Shade, and His Distinctions of Reason,” 111. 
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general exception, the individual experienced various shades of blue, which were each 
themselves distinct ideas without any necessary relations to each other. Over the course of time, 
and more experiences, however, these distinct ideas began to appear connected through the 
individual’s habits created from prior experiences. The individual then uses these benchmarks to 
measure the difference in hue, brightness, and saturation among the secondary impressions 
against the perceived blank, eventually filling in the gap with the final shade of blue. The habit 
does this by way of generalizing, categorizing, and comparing the secondary impressions in 
relation to the perceived blank. Therefore, it is a distinction of reason that creates the relation 
between the shades within Hume’s spectrum, giving the individual the ability to arrive at the 
missing shade of blue. 
The distinction of reason that makes this possible yet non-contradictory for Hume is 
discussed in the Treatise as well. When discussing abstract ideas, Hume gives us the following 
example:  
Thus when a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a white colour disposed 
in a certain form, nor are we able to separate and distinguish the color from the form. But observing 
afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of white, and comparing them with our former object, we 
find two separate resemblances, in what formerly seemed, and really is, perfectly inseparable. After a little 
more practice of this kind, we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour by a distinction of reason; that 
is, we consider the figure and colour together since they are in effect the same and undistinguishable; but 
still view them in different aspects, according to the resemblances, of which they are susceptible. When we 
consider only the figure of the globe of white marble, we form in reality an idea of both the figure and 
colour, but tacitly carry our eye to its resemblance with the globe of black marble (T 1.1.7.18).20                            
                                                          
20  Treatise, (T 1.1.7.18).  
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What Hume discusses here is the progression of initial sensory experiences in connection with 
the ability to reason allowing the individual to be able to dissect and categorize the initial 
inseparable experience. This system of progression, like that of the Missing Shade of Blue, is 
still dependent on the function of secondary impressions combined with abstract reasoning. In 
this case, the habit allows the individual to be able to distinguish between form and color similar 
to the filling in of the final shade of blue in the thought experiment. Thus, the missing shade is 
simply an exception to the rule in the same manner of one arriving at the idea of a gray colored 
block or globe. Although Hume does show a refinement of how ideas form in the above 
example, he still considers the Missing Shade of Blue a mere exception. This is on the basis that 
the missing shade of blue comes about mediately from impressions as opposed to immediately 
from them. Similarly, our capacity to distinguish form from color comes about mediately from 
the impressions of the different colors and shapes that we previously experience. Through the 
use of the marble globe and block example, therefore, we see not only an extension of the 
concept behind the Missing Shade of Blue but a reinforcement of why Hume thought his general 
maxim need no alteration.  
IV. Hume’s Copy Principle & Causality  
According to David Landy, Hume’s copy principle rests on two conditions that allow it to 
function. Landy identifies these two conditions as the following:  
1. The Resemblance Condition – which stipulates that the ideas an individual forms are 
exact representations of the impressions that they have felt.  
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2. The Causal Condition – a notion which states that an individual’s ideas are caused 
by their impressions and not vice versa.21  
Additionally, Landy states that both conditions are “necessary and jointly sufficient.”22 This 
means that an idea is required to meet both of these conditions in order to qualify as a copy. 
Therefore, if the final shade of blue fails to meet either condition, it gives us reason to say that 
Hume’s copy principle no longer holds. Since, however, the resemblance condition requires us to 
have both the idea and impression of the final shade of blue in the spectrum, it is not testable. In 
the Missing Shade of Blue, the individual obtains the simple idea of the final shade of blue, not 
its corresponding impression. Furthermore, Hume does not mention that the individual will 
receive the impression of the final shade after having the simple idea of the final shade of blue. 
Thus, in order to see if the Missing Shade of Blue debunks Hume’s copy principle, we need to 
see if it violates the causal condition set forth by Hume. 
 For the idea of the final shade of blue to violate the causal condition, it needs to cause the 
impression of the final shade of blue. In other words, a reversal of the causal order between ideas 
and impressions has to occur. Nancy Kendrick introduces this argument with her concept of 
temporal order. Specifically, she focuses on ‘reversed temporal order’23 when making her claim 
that it is often confused with ‘reversed causal order’. Kendrick succinctly states this when 
writing that the “idea of the missing shade of blue provides an exception to this temporal priority 
claim, but this reversed temporal relation does not provide sufficient grounds for supposing the 
causal relation to be reversed.”24 Thus, when looking at the Missing Shade of Blue, Hume does 
                                                          
21  David Landy, “Hume’s Impression/Idea Distinction,” 125. 
22  Ibid, Pp. 127. 
23  The temporal priority principle states that all causes must precede their respective effects.   
24  Nancy Kendrick, “Why Hume’s Counterexample is Insignificant and Why it is Not,” 970. 
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not imply that the simple idea of the found shade of blue causes the impression of it but rather 
that in this instance it simply came before it. In fact, Hume does not even mention anything else 
about the impression of the found shade other than that its simple idea came before it. This alone, 
does not violate the causal condition. 
Suppose, however, that we extend Hume’s thought experiment and say that after the 
individual found the missing shade of blue, we present the individual with paint along with a 
canvas asking him to mix together the final shade of blue. The individual should then be able to 
paint the found shade solely from the simple idea of the found shade. However, even if the 
individual is able to paint the found shade, it still does not show the reverse in causal order, or 
that the idea caused the impression. The question raised now is whether the simple idea or a 
sensory experience caused the impression of the final shade of blue. Thus, it is not possible to 
use an empirical test to see if the simple idea of the found shade causes the impression. Given 
this argument, therefore, there is simply not enough evidence to say that a violation in the causal 
condition or, by extension, the copy principle occurs. The copy principle then not only maintains 
its initial claims but simultaneously acknowledges and accepts the exception brought about 
before it. This, however, does not mean that the thought experiment itself is not altering the way 
in which Hume’s principle functions. A deeper analysis of Hume’s own view on the matter sheds 
light on this.  
V. Hume’s Self-Criticism 
 Hume’s writing, both in the Treatise and Enquiry as well as beyond, shows that he takes 
nothing on faith and self-critically analyzes and questions even his foundational principles. This 
is already notable in the fact that he took fifteen years to chisel away at the inessential portions of 
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the Treatise as well as concisely restate his philosophy in the Enquiry. Furthermore, he is critical 
of and publicly calls his own work, the Treatise, a ‘juvenile work’ in the same advertisement 
previously mentioned. Hence, we see that Hume constantly scrutinized himself, and took great 
care with his words. Looking closely at the Treatise itself also reveals this level of care, 
specifically regarding the Missing Shade of Blue.  
 The first instance from our analysis compares Hume’s copy principle that all ideas are 
copies of and arise from impressions, to the main formulation of the Missing Shade of Blue. 
Hume’s initial principle is stated as a universal rule, namely due to the fact that Hume uses the 
word all in his formulation of the principle. After mentioning the thought experiment as an 
exception, however, Hume subsequently refers to the principle only as a “general maxim.”25 
Unlike universal rules, general maxims allow for exceptions. As such, a valid general maxim 
“only needs to be true, as Aristotle stated regarding the maxims of his Ethics, ‘for the most 
part.’”26 Although subtle in nature, Hume does slightly change his reference to the copy principle 
after mentioning the Missing Shade of Blue. There is, however, a more direct example that 
follows later in the Treatise. 
 When discussing causal relations between ideas and impressions in the Treatise, Hume 
also presents a critique directly related to his previously mentioned Missing Shade of Blue. Here 
Hume directly addresses his firmly established copy principle, specifically with regards to any 
proof that may come up against it. The following quote targets examples like the Missing Shade 
of Blue that may arise:  
                                                          
25  Treatise, (T 1.1.1.10).  
26  Reginald Savage, “Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue,” 201. 
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Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possest of an idea, which is not preceded by any 
similar impression? This would be too strong a proof of levity and inconstancy; since the contrary principle 
has already so firmly established, as to admit of no farther doubt; at least till we have more fully examined 
the present difficulty (T 1.3.2.12).27 
In other words, the evidence backing the copy principle so great that, if there is such an idea that 
precedes its impression, then it would definitely warrant further examination. Hume, therefore, 
does not recommend a simple tossing aside of the general maxim since it has a great deal of 
empirical support. Rather, any contrary proofs need additional examination and empirical 
backing in order to determine if they are truly contradictory. Hume’s reasoning here takes into 
consideration his very own Missing Shade of Blue, which is in fact an exception. It, however, is 
not a contradictory one since the idea of the missing shade of blue comes about through 
secondary impressions coupled with abstract reasoning. Hume is, however, open and willing to 
accept any contrary proof as long as it is based on empirical evidence.   
 Another self-critique from Hume appears right after the Missing Shade of Blue in the 
Treatise. Specifically, Hume makes distinctions between what he terms primary and secondary 
ideas. Primary ideas are simply copies, or images, of our impressions, while secondary ideas are 
copies of primary ideas. Hence, we have a similar form of triangulation that presented itself 
within the Missing Shade of Blue. Hume goes on to say that this “is not, properly speaking, an 
exception to the rule so much as an explanation of it.”28 The reason this case is an explanation of 
the principle is because the foundation of both secondary and primary ideas are still impressions. 
It just so happens that in this case, there is a third step in between the two. Thus, a similar form 
of triangulation occurs as it did between our previously defined secondary impressions and 
                                                          
27  Treatise, (T 1.3.2.12). 
28  Treatise, (T 1.1.1.11). 
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simple ideas. That is, an impression yields a secondary impression, which, in turn, yields a 
simple idea when coupled with abstract reasoning.  
In the Missing Shade of Blue, this takes place between the previously experienced shades 
of blue, the function of these previous shades as secondary impressions when coupled with 
abstract reasoning, and the simple idea of the final shade of blue. The difference between the two 
cases, however, is large enough for Hume to admit that the Missing Shade of Blue case is an 
exception while stating that the primary and secondary ideas case is not. Therefore, as Nancy 
Kendrick concludes, we see that “while [the Missing Shade of Blue] does present a 
counterexample to the principle in the ways discussed above, [it] similarly serves as an 
explanation of, and even support for, Hume’s most basic empirical aims.” Furthermore, Hume’s 
explanation shows that he was well aware of the similar nature of the Missing Shade of Blue, 
with that of primary and secondary ideas, and sees it as no threat.  
VI. Possible Arguments against Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue Defused  
There are several contemporary philosophers that present different arguments against 
Hume showing how the Missing Shade of Blue weakens his empirical position. The arguments 
range from attacking the language within the text itself, specifically that of the Missing Shade of 
Blue, to Hume’s credibility directly. Each argument presented, however, stems from a 
misunderstanding of either Hume’s thought experiment or his empirical claims. The first 
argument against the Missing Shade of Blue deals with Hume’s claim about the example’s 
singularity. Specifically, Hume’s claim about the missing shade being a singular instance does 
not seem to be the case. Bernard Rollin, for example, writes that Hume’s exception is “far from 
singular” and that it is in fact “generalizable to an infinite number of such spectral cases, such as 
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regular gradations of musical tones, smells, and so forth.”29 In other words, Hume’s thought 
experiment does not need to focus just on shades of color but anything that is arrangeable in a 
spectrum. For example, the thought experiment is equally applicable to a spectrum of sound 
arranged in tonal order. In this example, the individual can arrive at the missing tonal sound in 
the same manner as Hume’s thought experiment. Therefore, it seems reasonable for Hume to 
either adjust his principles to account for this generalized exception or explicitly dismiss the 
though experiment. He, however, does neither.  
Rollin’s argument concerning the singularity of the missing shade of blue is defused 
when looking at the reasoning associated with Hume’s method of categorization. When Hume 
states that the “instance is so singular,” he essentially categorizes the example of the missing 
shade of blue as a type of idea within a series of other ideas. Karann Durland, for example, 
places the exception as a “simple idea of a member of a special sort of series, a series of simple 
sensibles (such as shades of the same hue) that differ from one another only by degree.”30 
Therefore, the categorization of the missing shade of blue is that of a type of idea that can fit into 
a spectrum of sorts. The spectrum can be of shades of color, differences in tone, or any other 
similar idea that can be a part of a series within a spectrum. Hence, the type of idea that the 
missing shade of blue falls under is in fact singular in nature. Durland borrows this concept from 
Robert Fogelin, who argues that the missing shade of blue is a member of this singular type of 
idea because after having experienced all the other shades of blue the subject just needs to 
“produce a specific peg to fit a determinate hole provided for it.”31 This means that any missing 
idea within a spectrum presented before an individual falls under the same type of idea as the 
                                                          
29  Bernard Rollin, “Hume’s Blue Patch and the Mind’s Creativity,” 120. 
30  Karann Durland, “Hume’s First Principle, His Missing Shade, and His Distinction of Reason,” 107. 
31  Robert Fogelin, “Hume and the Missing Shade of Blue,” 267. 
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missing shade of blue. Upon examining the so called ‘infinite’ amount of such cases involving 
senses like taste, smell and hearing, the common link, namely that each of the missing ideas in 
all the cases fits within a spectrum, places all such cases into this singular type of category. Thus, 
we can say that all ideas like the missing shade of blue are just different instances of this singular 
type. The function of each of those instances as an exception to Hume’s copy principle is, 
however, identical to that of the missing shade.  
A more common criticism of Hume directly focuses on how his Missing Shade of Blue 
contradicts the very principles he previously mentioned as well as further elaborated on in both 
the Treatise and Enquiry. Specifically, the attacks are generally in reference to the copy principle 
established by Hume in the beginning of the Treatise and Enquiry. What this implies is that if the 
missing shade of blue is a valid exception it should debunk the copy principle as a whole. After 
all, the copy principle cannot hold if the missing shade, according to Hume, is an instance where 
a simple idea does not have a corresponding impression. Furthermore, if the missing shade of 
blue was indeed an exception it would warrant an empirical explanation for the dismissal of such 
an exception.  
In order to know why the argument against Hume’s copy principle is not well grounded, 
we first need a deeper understanding of the principle itself. The two main points to keep in mind 
are that simple ideas are fainter copies of their corresponding simple impressions and that simple 
impressions precede simple ideas. With this in mind, the problem of the missing shade tends to 
be with the latter portion of the principle. This causal relation between ideas and impressions is 
what generally attempts to invalidate Hume’s entire copy principle. Durland, again, provides an 
argument for why Hume’s copy principle need not worry. She argues that since the exception is 
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founded on a priori32 grounds, it is more “illusory” and essentially is more of a “complex [idea] 
rather than simple.”33 However, this reasoning is itself very weak in that Hume himself regarded 
the missing shade of blue as an exception to his copy principle. 
 Donald Livingston, on the other hand, makes a strong case for Hume when claiming that 
the exception actually gives Hume the leverage he sought for his copy principle. He states the 
following:  
Moreover, the idea in question is described as the sort of idea for which an internal mastery could be 
achieved in the usual way and, in any case, is in fact achieved by the conditions of the hypothetical 
example. So whatever account we give the exception, it is stated in such a way as to be parasitic upon the 
very sort of internal understanding the first principle is supposed to capture. Hume, then, can be confident 
that for this sort of “exception” whatever modifications are necessary will be minor, need not be explored 
at the outset, and so should not affect the basic utility of the principle.34 
Livingston is essentially saying that since the simple idea itself is dependent on the simple ideas 
of the other shades of blue, which the individual did obtain through impressions. This ‘internal 
mastery’ that Livingston speaks of is simply referring to the function of what we previously 
termed secondary impressions coupled with abstract reasoning. In other words, as we already 
mentioned, the causal relation between ideas and impressions still holds. Hence, though the 
simple idea of the missing shade of blue itself may come before its simple impression, the fact 
that the attainment of the missing shade rests on the impressions of the other shades of blue does 
not invalidate the copy principle. Rather, the causal relations would now come in the order of 
                                                          
32  A priori is generally referred to as knowledge that is completely independent from experience. 
Conversely, a posteriori is referred to as empirical knowledge gained through sensory means. The issue here is 
that, as an empiricist, Hume is using and easily dismissing an exception that does not seem viable on a posteriori 
grounds.   
33  Karann Durland, “Hume’s First Principle, His Missing Shade, and His Distinction of Reason,” 106. 
34  Donald Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 85. 
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impressions, secondary impressions, and then the simple idea of the missing shade of blue. Our 
previous argument about the triangulation that occurs in order to obtain the missing shade of 
blue, therefore, diffuses these so called threats to Hume’s copy principle. 
When considering an explanation of the Missing Shade of Blue, we run into more 
problems simply because of the nature of the very example itself. Looking back at Hume’s 
thought experiment, which yields the missing shade of blue, the main issue becomes how he can 
argue for the missing shade as an exception. Specifically, empirically verifying the thought 
experiment proves to be futile. That is, after the individual has the idea of the missing shade of 
blue they should now be able to empirically prove to a third party that they in fact did obtain the 
missing shade. Bernard Rollin brings this issue forward and argues that Hume’s missing shade of 
blue “cannot be tested on these grounds since the act of actually verifying the test would in 
essence nullify the test itself.”35 According to Rollin, this occurs because we no longer know 
whether the individual obtained the simple idea prior to the impression he has just presented the 
third party. Suppose, for example, the individual has paint from all the previously experienced 
shades of blue and needs to prove that he has obtained the final shade by painting it on a surface. 
Even if the individual mixes the appropriate shades and does paint the final shade, it becomes 
unclear if the individual obtained the idea of the final shade prior to its impression. In other 
words, Hume’s example of the Missing Shade of Blue is one that formulates on a priori grounds 
while not being testable through a posteriori means.36 Hence, any attempts at empirically 
verifying the thought experiment would in fact nullify the very purpose of the attempt. 
                                                          
35  Bernard Rollin, “Hume’s Blue Patch and the Mind’s Creativity,” 127. 
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When considering the problem of validity of the exception as an exception, we can refer 
to our previous breakdown of the Missing Shade of Blue. Firstly, it is important to note what 
Hume is requesting of his readers when bringing up the counterexample. Specifically, when 
stating that the subject will first “perceive a blank” and then fill it, Hume is using deductive 
reasoning as his basis for arriving at the missing shade of blue. This means that the example 
itself is arrived at using purely logical reasoning as opposed to empirical evidence, which would 
have had to be obtained through sensory perception. Thus the missing shade is seen as being 
grounded as an a priori example.  
Knowing this, it becomes clear that Hume was intent on labeling the Missing Shade of 
Blue as an exception, unlike his categorization of primary and secondary ideas. If there was an 
idea that came prior to its impression, then it would in fact need to be grounded in a priori and 
have no empirical evidence in order to truly be an exception to Hume’s first principle. This very 
notion of the type of example that Hume presents in essence is the thing that makes the Missing 
Shade of Blue a valid exception. Attempting to prove the creation of the simple idea through an a 
posteriori test has the opposite effect in that, if proven true, it would show that the causal link 
between impressions and ideas is gray at best. This, however, is not a problem for Hume because 
it simply shows that the thought experiment he presents is indeed an exception while 
simultaneously not being a threat since testing it on a posteriori grounds proves inconclusive. An 
argument for changing the example to a different kind using different sensory perceptions may 
be tempting at this juncture.  
Any attempt made to find an example that can show the validity of Hume’s exception 
using an a posteriori test must simultaneously not nullify the causal condition set by Hume’s 
copy principle. Instead of shades of color, suppose different pitches of tones were used. 
P a g e  | 26 
 
Furthermore, the subject would then have experienced each different pitch except for one. In the 
same fashion of the Missing Shade of Blue, the subject would be able to fill in the blank for the 
tone after first perceiving as a “blank.” However, when comparing the tonal example to Hume’s 
Missing Shade of Blue it is clear that they both have the same validity problem. That is, no such 
a posteriori test can disprove the causal condition without nullifying the very purpose of the test. 
Furthermore, this is true for all such similar cases involving other sensory experiences. Hence, 
leaving the type of example as an a priori exception seems to work better for Hume’s sake with 
regards to the Missing Shade of Blue being a true exception.  
 The next argument against Hume focuses on the process of the thought experiment itself. 
Doing this, also poses a potential problem for Hume as well. Specifically, the issue deals with 
the concept of innate ideas as a result of the process of the thought experiment. William H. 
Williams takes note of this problem when stating that “the construction of the idea of the missing 
shade of blue obviously requires conceptual powers unaccounted for by impressions and their 
images.”37 Looking back at our analysis of the Missing Shade of Blue, the necessity of a certain 
level of abstract reasoning is evident in order for the missing shade of blue take shape. While 
Hume does not acknowledge the Missing Shade of Blue as being able to shake his foundation, 
the thought experiment shows that Hume’s exception might have cause to be a valid innate idea. 
Setting aside our previous argument for the triangulation of the missing shade, the possibility of 
the final shade of blue being an innate idea does present itself since it comes about without any 
corresponding impression. This in its own right should raise a red flag for Hume and warrant at 
least an explanation by him, a philosopher in the empiricist school. 
                                                          
37  William Williams, “Is Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue a Red Herring,” 87. 
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At this juncture, defining exactly what we mean by an innate idea is appropriate. There 
are three ways in which these words may apply in the context of the missing shade of blue: 
1. An idea that is inborn and a part of a person from birth.38 
2. An idea that does not come about from experience. 
3. An idea that comes about from a generalization of an experience. 
With regards to Hume’s missing shade, only the latter two definitions apply. As a strict 
empiricist, Hume is completely opposed to the notion that inborn innate ideas existed. When the 
Treatise and Enquiry focus on the copy principle as well as Hume’s general claim about the 
divisions of knowledge, they both show how experience was the precursor to ideas and 
knowledge. Hence, when looking at the missing shade of blue as an innate idea, it has to be an 
idea that either does not come about from experience or comes about from a generalization of an 
experience.  
 The second definition of innate ideas is the one that can hurt Hume’s case, specifically, 
his principles relating to the causal connection between ideas and impressions. If indeed there is 
an idea that does not come about through an experience, then the validity of empiricism as a 
whole begins to falter. However, the missing shade of blue case appears to fall most in line with 
the third definition of innate ideas. A generalization of prior experiences, in this case the 
secondary impressions of the other shades of blue, leads to the simple idea of the final shade of 
blue. Barry Stroud makes the distinction by calling them observed and unobserved ideas. 
Observed ideas come directly from experience, while unobserved ideas come from 
                                                          
38  This is the notion of innate knowledge proposed by rational philosophers like Descartes, who believed 
that humanity’s knowledge stemmed from the innate principles that were received from birth (generally 
attributed to God).  
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generalizations of prior experiences.39 Hume himself states that the process of generalizations 
take ideas from the observed distinction to the unobserved when discussing the formulation of 
our habits or customs. When viewing the case of the Missing Shade of Blue, it is the faculty of 
reason that generalizes prior experiences of the various shades of blue into the various gradations 
that eventually lead to the simple idea of the missing shade of blue. Thus, though the missing 
shade is an innate idea by our third definition, it is not strictly innate. Meaning, in the rational 
sense the simple idea of the missing shade of blue is still dependent on the generalization of past 
experiences.  
Regarding innate ideas, Nancy Kendrick brings forth a reasonable problem that she 
argues many have with Hume. Specifically, her issue is with Hume’s dismissive attitude of the 
missing shade of blue. According to Kendrick, the possibility of the simple idea being an innate 
idea itself can be damaging enough to Hume’s first principles. She claims that many argue Hume 
intentionally dismisses it because the inclusion of it would leave an even greater threat to his 
philosophy, specifically the notion of a synthetic a priori40 idea. This, in essence, means that 
people can have new ideas on the basis of things outside of their experiences. In other words, it 
would have supported an anti-empirical claim. This claim can then be taken and supportive of 
greater claims such as the existence of God in favor of the rationalists.41 Rationalists then have 
become right with regards to their notions of innate ideas as well as the origin of ideas. For 
Hume, that would mean the negation of his philosophical principles that he so strongly 
establishes in both his Treatise and Enquiry. However, we already argued that innate ideas, in 
                                                          
39  Barry Stroud, “Hume and the Idea of Causal Necessity,” Pp 52-53.  
40  Synthetic a priori was a principle introduced by Immanuel Kant and essentially states that new ideas can 
be formed from a purely conceptual realm.   
41  Proving the existence of God was a major debate between philosophers of both the rational and empirical 
schools during Hume’s time. Shifting the balance in this specific argument generally meant having more solid proof 
for either school’s philosophical principles.    
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this instance, refer to generalizations based on previous experiences, or the formulations of 
habits and customs.   
This being so, the problem initially raised by Kendrick about whether or not the missing 
shade is a synthetic a priori idea is defused. Since Hume’s exception, as previously mentioned, is 
grounded strictly in a priori, it cannot be referred to as being synthetic. Even though the ideas 
used to attain the missing shade of blue are they themselves synthetic, since they were 
experienced, the idea of the missing shade itself is not. The idea of the missing shade of blue is 
somewhat of a fiction in this sense. It is a fiction because it forms within the mind but has no 
valid way of presenting itself outside of the mind. The latter was evident when we looked at the 
futility of trying to empirically prove a violation within the causal condition of the copy 
principle. Hume, therefore, does not need to consider the missing shade of blue as an innate idea 
a serious threat beyond the dismissal and labeling of it as an exception to his general maxim.  
Lastly, the ability to find the missing shade of blue may prove difficult for Hume given 
various writings on optics. Eric Schliesser, for example, has argued that Hume’s missing shade 
of blue stands “in contradiction to the implications of Newton’s optical researches.”42 More 
directly, Schliesser’s main point shows how Hume does not take Newton’s insights regarding the 
difficulty of finding the missing shade of blue into account and “turn an objection into a 
constructive element in an ongoing research enterprise.”43 Newton’s optical experiments indicate 
that when the shades of colors gets close enough it becomes impossible for the subject to be able 
to distinguish between shades. Hence, if Newton’s research is correct, then Hume’s entire 
example would at the very least raise questions and not be seen as an exception. Additionally, 
                                                          
42  Eric Schliesser, “Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue Reconsidered from a Newtonian Perspective,” Pp 164-165. 
43  Ibid, Pp 164. 
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Schliesser points to the following passage from the Treatise to show how Hume is once again 
contradicting himself: “it be impossible to judge exactly of the degrees or any quality, such as 
colour, taste, heat, cold, when the difference betwixt them is very small.”44 When considering 
the demands of Hume’s thought experiment, it seems contradictory that he requires the subject to 
make the determination in degrees of shades of blue while several pages later in the Treatise he 
himself claims that it is impossible to make such determinations in degree. 
 Taking this further, Schliesser focuses on Hume’s approach as resting on two apparent 
“commonsensical, but unempirical tacit assumptions: that we view (shades of) colors as discrete 
entities and that our experiences and knowledge of the world does not influence what we see.”45 
Essentially Schliesser is arguing that if Hume is leaning on the first assumption that different 
shades of blue are individually distinct ideas, then bringing these ideas together for a similar 
purpose, in this instance to find the missing shade, becomes difficult. Finally, taking into account 
the notion of Newton’s Rule IV,46 Schliesser shows that deviations from maxims should not 
warrant a simple dismissal, like Hume tends to do with the exception of the missing shade of 
blue. Instead, they should promote new research and findings. 
Newtonian arguments against Hume by Schliesser, however, are insufficient as well. 
Firstly, Hume acknowledged the main issue of the impossibility of being able to distinguish 
between two shades of color in the Treatise. However, even in granting this to be the case, we 
may tailor the thought experiment itself so that it meets the new criterion. The experiment can 
now just be a bit more specific and state that the previously experienced shades of color placed 
                                                          
44  Treatise, (T 1.3.1.2).  
45  Eric Schliesser, “Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue Reconsidered from a Newtonian Perspective,” 165. 
46  Newton’s Rule IV states that propositions should be treated as true until there are deviations from such 
propositions. These deviations, however, should promote new research and a refinement or rejection of the 
original propositions.   
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before the individual be in a degree that is distinguishable. This will not change the outcome of 
the individual being able to fill in the missing shade of blue. As a result, Hume is both agreeing 
with Newtonian optics but still maintaining his exception on the grounds of a more broad 
distinction of shades presented in the thought experiment. Additionally, Hume’s dismissal of the 
exception does not preclude his philosophy from finding Newton’s Rule IV as a useful tool. It is 
in fact quite the contrary as we previously discussed when analyzing Hume’s self-critique. 
Essentially, Hume is definitely open to the idea of further examination but felt that the missing 
shade of blue did not make any real impact on his initial claims regarding ideas and impressions.  
Finally, the difficulty of being able to bring two distinct ideas together is really not as 
difficult as Schliesser claims it is. Difficulty, in this sense, is referring to how well Hume’s 
claims can allow for such collaboration between ideas. It is relatively clear in both the Enquiry 
and Treatise that Hume does believe in the ability for distinct ideas to be used by the faculty of 
reason, or ‘imagination’, in order to serve a third related purpose. The initial impressions that 
turn into simple ideas, according to Hume, are necessities in order for one to form ‘customs’, 
‘habits’, and fictional ideas not found in reality. For example, the initial impressions that one has 
of a horse and various birds can cause their imagination to come up with the idea of Pegasus 
even though no such creature exists. This is also the case for the missing shade of blue with the 
surrounding shades serving as secondary impressions and the mind going through a process of 
abstract reasoning in order to arrive at the missing shade. In both cases, the abstract ideas formed 
through the faculty of reason are what create the relation between not only the various distinct 
secondary impressions but also to the idea of final shade of blue.     
VII. Conclusion 
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 Although Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue appears to contradict his initial claims about the 
relation between impressions and ideas in his copy principle, my analysis shows that this is not 
the case. Hume’s copy principle holds in this unusual case by way of triangulation among 
impressions, secondary impressions, and the simple idea of the missing shade. From this, I then 
moved onto discussing how Hume’s principle allows for the Missing Shade of Blue to be a valid 
exception while simultaneously not a threat to his core commitments. I accomplished this by 
analyzing the components of my initial break down of the thought experiment. Then, upon 
looking at Hume’s copy principle in greater detail, I established that the causal condition 
between ideas and impressions remained intact. From this point I transitioned into Hume 
himself, specifically, his character and self-critique of his works. My focus here was to argue that 
given Hume’s character and nature, it is evident that the inclusion of the Missing Shade of Blue, 
as Hume intended, strengthens his Treatise and Enquiry.  
 Finally, I made the transition into critiquing various arguments that might be made 
against Hume. The arguments discussed dealt both broadly and specifically with Hume’s 
Missing Shade of Blue. In a broad sense, I looked at arguments targeting the function of the 
thought experiment, the principles it relates to, such as the copy principle, as well as its surface 
contradictions. More minutely, I looked at arguments within the actual thought experiment. 
These include: Hume’s quick dismissal of the thought experiment, the missing shade’s ability to 
be a valid innate idea, and the issue surrounding the thought experiment’s singularity. All of the 
arguments against Hume, however, were easily refuted as they stemmed mostly from 
misunderstandings of the Missing Shade of Blue within the context of Hume’s empirical 
philosophy. My analysis therefore, shows that Hume’s thought experiment in fact strengthened 
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his claims by allowing for greater versatility. As a result, we see a more open-minded and critical 

















P a g e  | 34 
 
References 
Becker, Lon. "The Missing Shade of Blue as a Proof Against Proof." British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy 18.1 (2010): 35-44. EBSCO Host. Routledge. Web. 
<http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=4d97b8f0-d95c-44f6-897e-
95037e93778d%40sessionmgr4003&vid=2&hid=4203>.  
Butler, Ronald J. "Hume's Impressions." Impressions of Empiricism. Ed. Godfrey Norman 
Vesey. New York: St. Martin's, 1976. 120-35. Print.  
Downing, Lisa, "George Berkeley", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/berkeley/>. 
Durland, Karánn. "Hume's First Principle, His Missing Shade, and His Distinctions of Reason." 
Hume Studies 22.1 (1996): 105-21. Hume Studies Onine. Hume Society. Web. 
<http://www.humesociety.org/hs/issues/v22n1/durland/durland-v22n1.pdf>.  
Fogelin, Robert J. "Hume and the Missing Shade of Blue." Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 45.2 (1984): 263. JSTOR. International Phenomenological Society. Web. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107428>.  
Hume, David. "Author's Advertisement." Introduction. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998. N. pag. Project Gutenberg. 12 Jan. 2010. Web. 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4320/4320-h/4320-h.htm>.  
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 1748. Classics of Western 
Philosophy. 7th ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006. 763-828. Print.  
P a g e  | 35 
 
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Project 
Gutenberg. 15 Nov. 2011. Web. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/9662/9662-h/9662-
h.htm>.  
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. 1740. Classics of Western Philosophy. 7th ed. 
Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006. 829-55. Print.  
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Project Gutenberg. 10 Nov. 2012. 
Web. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm>.  
Hume, David. "My Own Life." Letter. 18 Apr. 1776. The University of Adelaide. 
Ebooks@Adelaide, 26 Feb. 2014. Web. 
<http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hume/david/h92my/#life>.  
Johnson, D.M. "Hume's Missing Shade of Blue, Interpreted as Involving Habitual Spectra." 
Hume Studies 10.2 (1984): 109-24. Hume Studies Online. Hume Society. Web. 
<http://www.humesociety.org/hs/issues/v10n2/johnson/johnson-v10n2.pdf>.  
Kendrick, Nancy. "Why Hume's Counterexample Is Insignificant and Why It Is Not." British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy 17.5 (2009): 955-79. EBSCO Host. Routledge. 
Web. <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=fff42b4a-67f3-490e-
a924-62d9c0df0d63%40sessionmgr4002&vid=2&hid=4203>.  
Landy, David. "Hume's Impression/Idea Distinction." Hume Studies 32.1 (2006): 119-39. Hume 
Studies Online. Hume Society. Web. 
<http://www.humesociety.org/hs/issues/v32n1/landy/landy-v32n1.pdf>.  
Livingston, Donald W., and James T. King. Hume: A Re-evaluation. New York: Fordham UP, 
1976. 91-180. Print.  
P a g e  | 36 
 
Livingston, Donald W. Hume's Philosophy of Common Life. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1984. 80-
90. Print.  
Morris, William Edward, "David Hume", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/hume/>. 
Rollin, Bernard E. "Hume's Blue Patch and the Mind's Creativity." Journal of the History of 
Ideas 32.1 (1971): 119-28. Print.  
Savage, Reginald O. "Hume's Missing Shade of Blue." History of Philosophy Quarterly 9.2 
(1992): 199-206. Web.  
Schliesser, Eric. "Hume's Missing Shade of Blue Reconsidered From a Newtonian Perspective." 
Journal of Scottish Philosophy 2.2 (2004): 164-75. Print.  
Sheridan, Patricia, "Locke's Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/locke-moral/>. 
Stroud, Barry. "Hume and the Idea of Causal Necessity." Philosophical Studies 33.1 (1978): 39-
59. JSTOR. Springer. Web. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319195>.  
Stroud, Barry. "The Theory of Ideas." Hume. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1981. 17-42. 
Routledge. Web. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/baruch//docDetail.action?docID=10060780>.  
Williams, William H. "Is Hume's Shade of Blue a Red Herring?" Synthese 92.1 (1992): 83-99. 
Print.  
